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This paper builds on theoretical predictions that show 
that gains from regional integration are unevenly 
distributed between resource rich and poor countries. It 
explores the effects of different integration schemes in 
the Middle East and North Africa. The results suggest 
that within the Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement, there 
is significant trade creation for resource poor countries 
associated with regional integration, and no evidence 
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of trade diversion. In resource rich countries, however, 
there is evidence of pure trade diversion in both resource-
rich/labor-abundant countries and resource-rich/labor-
importing countries. This underscores the idea that 
regional integration can help to spread the benefits of 
unevenly distributed resource wealth among the region’s 
economies.Regional Integration and Natural Resources: 































JEL: F10, F11 
Keywords: Regionalism, MENA, PAFTA. 
 
   
                                                 
 We are grateful to Olivier Cadot, Ndiame Diop, Lionel Fontagné, Caroline Freund, Alan Gelb, Jaime de 
Melo, Maurice Schiff and Anthony Venables for their comments. This paper is part of a broader project of 
MENA (MNSED group) sponsored by MDTF, which aims to understand the impact of the natural resources 
on growth and diversification in Middle East and North Africa economies. 
 
 European Institute, University of Geneva, email: celine.carrere@unige.ch 
The  World Bank and CEPII, Paris, email: jgourdon@worldbank.org and julien.gourdon@cepii.fr  
 Economics Department, University of Geneva and CEPR, email: marcelo.olarreaga@unige.ch. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Non-renewable natural resources account for some 15% of world trade. A very high 
proportion of the output of the sector is traded internationally (more than two-thirds 
of oil output is traded) and many resource producers are almost totally dependent on 
resource  exports  for their foreign  exchange. The characteristics  of these countries 
raise issues for the analysis of regional economic integration within regions with such 
countries.  They  have  little  chance  of  following  a  manufacturing  export  path  to 
economic development and resources abundance ensures a flow of foreign exchange 
in the region. Conversely their resource poor neighbors are critically short of foreign 
exchange  and  would  benefit  from  those  markets  to  expand  and  diversify  their 
manufacturing  sector.  These  circumstances  make  it  natural  to  think  that  regional 
integration might be particularly valuable. 
 
However,  for  trade  in  natural  resources,  the  issue  of  trade  creation  and  trade 
diversion  is  somewhat  different,  even  unique.  This  is  because,  relative  to 
manufactured goods, tariff and non-tariff barriers on natural resource commodities 
such as oil, natural gas, metals and minerals tend to be low (Carbaugh, 2007). Hence, 
an analysis of potential trade creation and trade diversion effects when two resource-
abundant countries enter into a preferential trade agreement will be a function of the 
extent of specialization – whether both have complete specialization in the production 
and  export  of  resource-intensive  goods,  or  whether  the  relatively  resource-poor 
country has a small, developing manufacturing sector as well. 
 
In a recent theoretical paper Venables (2011) argues that we are likely to observe 
some  degree  of  trade  diversion  when  a  resource  rich  country  enters  into  a 
preferential  trade  agreement  with  a  relatively  labor  abundant  country.  In  such  a 
situation, the preferential agreement will create incentives for labor-intensive goods 
to  be  sourced  from  the  resource  poor  country.  This  will  help  the  resource  poor 
country extend its regional exports and reach a higher level of economic growth. But 3 
 
this  will  be  achieved  at  the  expense  of  the  resource  rich  country,  which  will 
experience trade diversion, as it substitutes imports from the relatively more efficient 
rest of the world towards the regional partner.  
 
In order to empirically address these questions we explore the extent to which Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) different integration schemes have led to trade creation 
and trade  diversion. Half a  century after the creation  of the  Arab League in 1945 
aiming at intensifying regional trade in the region,1 MENA’s spaghetti bowl of regional 
integration agreements has little to envy compared with those in Latin America or 
Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008).2 However, in spite of the numerous regional 
trade agreements, the extent of intra-regional trade is only a tenth of total trade, and 
is below what a standard gravity model (which explains bilateral trade using distance 
between partners and the economic size of the two partners) would predict (Miniesy 
et al., 2004 or Péridy, 2007).  
 
Regardless  of  whether  MENA’s  intra-regional  trade  remains  too  small,  this  paper 
explores the extent to which regional trade agreements have contributed to intra-
regional trade, and whether this has entailed trade diversion, and therefore broader 
economic efficiency.  
 
We  put  forward  standard  panel  gravity  model  where  aggregate  imports  of  MENA 
countries are explained using bilateral fixed effects and year-specific importer and 
exporter  fixed  effects.  These  fixed  effects  control,  among  other  things,  for  the 
traditional  determinants  of  a  gravity  equation,  such  as  distance,  colonial  links, 
common language, as well as GDP, population, MFN tariffs of the exporter and the 
importer and unobservable trade costs/price indices (see Anderson and Van Wincoop 
2003) .  
 
                                                 
1 Clause 2 of the protocol reads : « the Arab States…shall closely cooperate in…commercial exchange, 
customs…” and in 1982 an agreement was reached for the development of intra-regional trade (Decree 848 of 
27/2/1982.   
2 A list of these often overlapping agreements is given in the Appendix. 4 
 
We then introduce different types of dummies to capture the impact of the creation of 
trade agreements on intra-regional imports and imports from the rest-of-the world as 
in  Carrère  (2006).  The  coefficient  on  the  variable  capturing  the  impact  on  intra-
regional imports measures the extent of trade creation (in the Lipsey (1957), rather 
than Viner (1950) sense3), and the coefficient on the variable capturing the impact on 
imports from the rest-of-the-world measures the extent of trade diversion (again, in 
the Lipsey sense).  
 
Results  of  our  basic  specification  suggest  that  there  is  trade  creation  in  most 
agreements, and that trade diversion may only be a problem in the Pan-Arab Free 
Trade Area (PAFTA), in particular when considering non-oil imports.4 As predicted by 
Venables (2011) trade diversion seems to be concentrated in resource rich importers. 
These are generally countries that export only a few products and with a   highly 
concentrated  export  bundle.  Interestingly,  these  countries  have  also  significantly 
increased  their  exports  of  non -oil  goods  to  resource  poor  countries,  but  these 
increases were not accompanied by trade diversion in resource poor countries.  
 
Thus, MENA regional integration has been mainly trade creating, and both resource 
poor and resource rich countries have seen increases in their exports of non-oil goods 
to  the  region.  Trade  diversion  was  observed  only  in  resource  rich  countries, 
suggesting  that  MENA’s  preferential  agreements  were  associated  with  spreading 
benefits of unevenly distributed resource wealth among the region’s economies. 
 
Section 2 presents Venables (2011) analytical setup with predictions on the extent of 
trade  diversion  and trade  creation  when  regional integration  takes  place  between 
                                                 
3 Trade creation in the Viner sense occurs only when the regional partner is the lowest cost supplier. This is 
not necessary to observe trade creation according to Lipsey’s definition which will be observed whenever 
intra-regional trade increases conditional on not displacing imports from the rest-of-the-world. Thus, trade 
creation in the Viner sense is a sufficient but not necessary condition to observe trade creation in the Lipsey 
sense. 
4 As can be seen in the Appendix PAFTA was signed in 1996 and entered into force in 1998. It was signed by 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen.  5 
 
resource poor and resource rich countries.  Section 3 presents the empirical model 
applied  to  MENA,  and  section  4  discusses  data  sources  and  variable  construction. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Trade  agreements  between  resource  poor  and  resource  rich 
countries: An analytical setup5 
 
Let us assume a three-country world with two countries which are natural resource 
abundant  and  form  a  preferential  trade  agreement.  One  should  expect  little  trade 
creation from such an agreement if the two countries have a comparative advantage 
in the same natural resource. Indeed, there is no reason for these countries to trade 
and therefore little trade creation or trade diversion should be expected from such an 
agreement.  On  the  other  hand  if  the  countries  are  abundant  in  different  natural 
resources, then trade creation can be expected, and this will be accompanied of little 
trade  diversion.  Thus,  the  first  prediction  for  regional  integration  among  natural 
resource abundant countries is that this should be accompanied of no trade diversion 
and mild levels of trade creation. 
 
If the preferential trade agreement on the other hand is signed by a natural resource 
abundant country and a natural resource poor country with a small but developing 
manufacturing sector, then the introduction of tariff preferences will probably lead to 
some trade creation in the resource poor country, as it will be able to import more 
natural  resources  from  the  resource  rich  country6.  There  is  little  scope  for  the 
resource poor country to suffer from trade diversion if the resource abundant country 
is specialized in the natural resource good. On the other hand, the resource rich 
country may suffer from a significant amount of trade diversion as the resource poor 
country  benefiting  from  the  preferential  access  can  increase  its  exports  to  the 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily from Venables (2011) and WTO (2010). 
6 As surprising as it could appear, resource poor countries in MENA for instance applied tariffs (13 percent) 
on imports of resources commodities such as oil from resource abundant countries of the region (GCC) before 
PAFTA implementation. See the Appendix. 6 
 
resource rich country of manufacturing goods, while continuing to exports natural 
resource intensive goods to the rest of the world.  
 
As suggested by Fouquin et al (2006) and Venables (2011) this explains why resource 
rich  countries  have  not  been  a  driver  of  regional  integration  schemes  in  the 
developing world. Such schemes would imply income redistribution from resource 
rich  countries  to  resource  poor  countries.  Indeed,  preferential  access  allows 
producers in resource-poor countries to benefit from higher prices in the resource-
rich country. This increases producer surplus in the exporting resource-poor country, 
and reduces tariff revenue in the importing resource-rich country. So the resource-
poor country is better-off, whereas the resource-rich country tends to be worse-off.7  
 
Whether this is desirable for the region as a whole is an empirical question. In the 
pure-trade diverting  case, where the increase in exports from the resource -poor 
country to the resource -rich country is accompanied by an equivalent decline in 
imports  of  the  resource -rich  country  from  the  rest -of-the-world,  the  region  will 
unambiguously be worse-off.  Thus, a necessary condition for the region to be better 
off is that the increase in intra-regional trade is larger than the decline in trade with 
the rest-of-the-world.  
 
This can be checked with our empirical model. We will first test the second prediction 
in Venables (2011) that suggests that when resource rich countries sign preferential 
trade agreements with resource poor countries, the former are more likely to suffer 
from trade diversion than the latter, and we will then checked whether in this case, 
the increase in exports from the resource-poor country to the resource-rich country is 
larger than the fall in the resource-rich country imports from the rest-of-the-world.  
 
3.  The empirical model for MENA  
                                                 
7 Note that consumer prices may also decline in the resource-rich importing country if the supply of the 
resource-poor exporting country is sufficiently large, which may bring gains for the resource-rich importing 
country.  7 
 
 
We follow a standard gravity equation approach to assess the extent of trade creation 
and  diversion  associated  with  MENA’s  preferential  trade  agreements.  Bilateral 
imports  of  MENA  countries  with  respect  to  each  of  its  regional  and  non-regional 
partners are explained by a series of bilateral fixed effects that capture the effects of 
distance, colonial links and any other time-invariant characteristics of each bilateral 
pair, as well as year-specific importer and export fixed effects that capture the impact 
of the evolution of GDP, population, MFN tariffs or any other importer and year, or 
exporter and year characteristics. In particular, the importer-year and exporter-year 
fixed  effects  allows  to  avoid  the  bias that  will  be  associated  with the  omission  of 
exporter  and  importer  remoteness  terms  (see  Anderson  and  VanWincoop,  2003). 
More formally:  
 
12 ln RTAintra RTArow
ijt ijt
k k k k
ijt ij it jt ijt kk M               
         (1) 
 
where  ijt M are country i (MENA) import from j in year t,  RTAintra
k
ijt = 1 if i and j 
belong to the same RTA k in t, otherwise 0 (intra-regional trade), and RTArow
k
ijt = 1 if i 
but not j belongs to the RTA k  in t, otherwise 0. The coefficient of the first term  
k
1   
captures  trade  creation  in  the  Lispey  sense,  and  the  second  term   
k
2    trade-
diversion.  ij ʱ  are bilateral fixed effects,  it ʴ are the importer-year specific effects, and 
jt γ are the exporter-year fixed effect.  ijt ν is an i.i.d. error term.  
 
The k agreements we explore include PAFTA, The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
AGADIR,  COMESA  (which  also  involves  some  Easter  and  Sub-Saharan  African 
countries), all Euromed agreements signed by MENA countries, all FTAs with EFTA 
countries and all FTA with Turkey (for a list containing each of these agreements, see 
the appendix).  
 8 
 
We then explore within the same gravity setup how patterns of trade creation and 
trade diversion vary across bilateral pairs depending on whether there are resource 
rich or resource poor. This could be done only for PAFTA as this is the only trade 
agreement within MENA involving both resource rich and resource poor countries.8 
PAFTA is also one of the well-functioning regional trade agreements in MENA. Indeed 
as  argued  by  Hoekman  and  Zarrouk  (2009),  intra -PAFTA  trade  barriers  have 
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where  RR and  RP  capture whether the importer or the exporter is considered as a 
resource rich or resource poor country respectively. As before RTAintra
k
ijt = 1 if i and j 
belong to the same RTA k in t, otherwise 0, and  RTArow
k
ijt = 1 if i but not j belongs to 
the RTA k in t, otherwise 0. The intra variables of PAFTA are then interacted with  i RR
and i RP ,  as  well  as  j RR and  j RP to  explore  the  degree  of  heterogeneity  on  trade 
creation within MENA depending on whether the importer and exporter are resource 
rich  or  poor.  Then  1 β   captures  trade  creation  between  rich  resource  countries in 
PAFTA;  2 β   when  the  importer  is  resource  rich  and  the  exporter  is  resource  poor 
within PAFTA;  3 β when both PAFTA countries are resource poor, and  4 β when the 
importer is resource poor, but the exporter is resource rich within PAFTA.  
                                                 
8 According to World Bank’s classification resource poor countries in PAFTA include Tunisia, Morocco, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, West Bank of Gaza and Djibouti. Resource rich countries can be divided into 
two sub-categories. GCC Oil exporters include UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain. 
Developing Oil Exporters include: Yemen, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria.  
9 Although as argued by them and Chauffour (2011) there is still some important work left in terms of non-
tariff barriers. 9 
 
 
The specification in (2) also allows for heterogeneity in trade diversion within PAFTA 
depending on whether the importer or the exporter are resource rich or poor.  5 β
captures the extent of trade diversion if the PAFTA importer is resource rich, and  6 β
when the PAFTA importer  is resource poor. 
 
Because  within  PAFTA  we  can  further  distinguish  between  resource  rich  labor 
abundant (i.e. developing oil exporter) and resource rich labor importing (i.e. GCC oil 
exporter)  countries,  we  also  explored  the  heterogeneity  in  trade  creation  and 
diversion after this further decomposition. 
 
Finally, and partly because these categories are pre-determined by the World Bank, 
we test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative to the resource poor and 
resource rich categories of the World Bank. We then introduce a variable capturing 
the degree of export concentration of the exporter and the importer. The rationale is 
that countries that are relatively abundant in natural resources will tend to have a 
more  concentrated  export  bundle,  whereas  countries  less  abundant  in  natural 
resources will have a more diversified export bundle. This will lead to effects similar 
to the ones described in Venables (2011) with more concentrated countries suffering 
from trade diversion and more diversified countries benefitting from trade diversion 
to its more concentrated partners. As proxies for the degree of concentration of the 
export bundle we use the Herfindhal index of export concentration, and the number of 
exported goods at the six digit of the Harmonized System average over the three year 
period preceding the entrance in force of the PAFTA agreement. The estimated gravity 
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0 jt CI is a measure of the exporter’s export bundle concentration (Herfindhal 
index or number of lines exported) in year t0, with t0 being an average over the 3 years 
preceding the entry of country j in the agreement. When the CI is indexed i it captures 
the concentration of the export bundle of the importer in the 3 year previous to the 
signing of the agreement. Thus,  2 λ captures the extent to which one could expect a 
strongest degree of trade creation when the exporter is relatively more concentrated 
than the importer (if  2 λ >0). And  4 λ captures whether trade diversion is expected to be 
larger (if  4 λ <0) when the importer has a highly concentrated production structure. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that because all specifications imply controlling for a very 
large  number  of  dummy  variables,  we  decided  for  computational  reasons  not  to 
introduce thousands of fixed effects, but to compute deviations from the mean for 
each  of  these  variables.  Because,  there are  several  dimensions  in  our  fixed  effects 
(bilateral, importer-year and exporter-year), the calculation of the deviations to the 
mean is not straightforward. Each variable was transformed as follows: 
 
. . . .. . . .. ... ijt ijt ij i t jt i j t y y y y y y y y y                    (4) 
 
We then apply a simple OLS estimator to the transformed variables in each of the 
specifications in equations (1) to (3). To control for potential correlation of the error 
term  within  country  pairs,  we  correct  the  standard  errors  for  clustering  within 
country pair.  
 
 
4.  Data and variable construction 
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Bilateral import data for 18 MENA countries (all except Iraq and West Bank of Gaza) 
and 239 partners is from United Nation’s Comtrade10. We use data for the period 
1990-2009 (20 years) as in the 1980s MENA regionalism was non-existent. Data for 
Libya is mirrored because Libya does not report to the United Nations system. These 
differences  in  data  sources  for  Libya  are  partly  controlled  for  in  our  empirical 
specification by the importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. 
 
We use total import data, but also data on non-oil imports11. In a robustness check we 
also used data that subtract re-exports from bilateral import data12, but the results are 
almost identical to those reported in the next section. 
 
We use WTO notifications to capture the year of entry into force of the agreement 13, 
and these available in the appendix. As already mentioned, we looks at the trade 
effects of  PAFTA, The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), AGADIR, COMESA, all Euromed 
agreements signed by MENA countries, all FTAs with EFTA countries and all FTA with 
Turkey.14  We decided not to include dummies for the FTA signed by some MENA 
countries and the US because these are too recent to meaningfully estimate their 
impact. We also do not control for the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) for 
three reasons. First, the only MENA country in ECO is Iran. Second, it starts in 1992 
and therefore captures almost our entire time variation. Including ECO would request 
expanding the time-span. Third, and more importantly, it is well known that ECO has 
been suffering from serious implementation problems, and therefore not much should 
                                                 
10 were obtained through the World Bank’s web platform: WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) 
11 We exclude HS27: Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distillation from total imports. 
12 Hence results are not driven by re-export from UAE which is classified a resource-rich country, and whose 
re-exports are indeed large. To check the sensitivity of our results to the presence of UAE, we took UAE from 
the sample, and re-estimated the regressions. None of the coefficients change sign or loses significance and 
none is statistically different from the ones currently reported in the paper. 
13 Since we take account of agreement solely after their entry in force we do not capture possible anticipation 
effect. 
14 Some of these agreements overlap and this is sometimes referred to as MENA’s spaghetti’s bowl. However, 
there are always differences between these agreements in terms of membership and timing which allow for 
the identification of their impact on trade flows. Note, however, that we focus in the paper on the RR and RP 
trade relationship, which is PAFTA’s specific, as it is the only MENA trade agreement where both RR and 
RP countries are present. 12 
 
be  expected (Pomfret, 2007).  Note, however, that the  results  reported in the  next 
section are robust to the inclusion of ECO.  
 
Of all the trade agreements we considered only one includes MENA countries that can 
be classified as resource poor and resource rich, and that is PAFTA. For a description 
of countries under each category, see footnote 8.  
 
The Herfindhal indices of export concentration and the number of export lines at the 
six digit HS level are computed using HS 6 digit data from United Nation’s Comtrade. 
They are measured before the entry in force of the agreement and are based on total 
export by product of each country to the world. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1) for seven preferential 
trade agreements involving MENA countries. Both intra and rest-of-the-world (row) 
effects are reported for each of the seven agreements. The first column reports results 
using total imports, whereas the second column reports results for non-oil imports. 
The  first  point  to  notice  is  that  there  are  no  statistically  significant  differences 
between the coefficients reported under the two columns for total imports and non-oil 
imports. 
 
In all agreements except AGADIR (involving Egypt Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and 
GCC  (Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  United  Arab  Emirates)  we 
found a positive, large and statistically significant coefficient on intra-regional trade. 
The fact that AGADIR and GCC do not find a statistically significant coefficient for 
intra-regional  trade  can  be  partly  explained  by  the  fact  that  all  AGADIR  and  GCC 
countries are part of PAFTA and entered into force after PAFTA. So the advantages in 
terms of intra-regional liberalization that AGADIR and GCC offer may be limited.  
 13 
 
More interestingly, the only agreement to show a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for imports from the rest-of-the-world is PAFTA and for non-oil imports 
only. For all other trade agreements, the coefficient is either positive or statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that trade diversion is not an important problem.15  
 
In the case of PAFTA the coefficient on non-fuel imports from the rest of the world is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level (col. 2). It is much smaller than the 
coefficient on trade creation. Indeed, the estimated percentage increase in intra -
regional trade due to PAFTA is around 195 percent  95 1 1
082 1 . e
.   .16 The percentage 
decline in imports from the rest of the world is 18 percent. One has to be careful 
however with the basis on which these numbers are calculated. Intra -PAFTA imports 
are only 11 percent of PAFTA imports from the world. So an 18 percent decli ne on 
something that is almost 10 times larger is not too far off a 195 percent increase on 
something that is 11 times smaller. Thus, this seems to suggest that most of the 
increases in intra-regional trade within PAFTA are simply substituting for imports 
from the rest-of-the-world and could therefore be an important source of inefficiency.  
 
If the increase in intra-PAFTA trade is fully compensated by a fall in PAFTA imports 
from the rest of the world, then it is clear that PAFTA was welfare reducing for t he 
region.17 And this is a hypothesis that the estimates for PAFTA in the second column 
of Table 1 cannot statistically reject.  
 
In order to assess the degree to which trade diversion in PAFTA may be concentrated 
in resource rich countries, Table 2 reports results of the estimation of the specification 
                                                 
15 A positive and statistically significant coefficient could be rationalized if goods imported from the region 
and from the rest-of-the-world are seen as complements by consumers, or producers of final goods.  
16 Because the left-hand-side variable (imports) is in logs and the right-hand-side variable is a dummy (trade 
agreement by different type of countries), then the percentage increase in imports is given by the exponential 
of the coefficient minus 1. All percentage changes discussed below are computed as discussed here. 
17 Indeed, this is the classic case of pure-trade diversion. Total consumption in the importing country does not 
change if the increase in intra-regional imports is compensated by an equal decline in imports from the rest-
of-the-world. The only impact in the importing country is the loss of tariff revenue associated with imports 
from the regional partner. The exporting country receives that gross transfers, as its producers now receive a 
higher price, and produce more, but these additional goods are produced at a cost that is higher than the price 
at which these good could be purchased in world markets. Thus, the region as a whole is worse off.  14 
 
in  equation  (2).  Again,  the  first  column  reports  results  for  total  imports  and  the 
second column for non-oil imports only. Results are not statistically different from 
each other across columns. The intra-PAFTA trade creation is now disentangle into 
four possible categories: trade creation among resource rich countries in the first row; 
trade creation when the importer is resource rich and the exporter is resource poor in 
the second row; trade creation when the importer is resource poor and the exporter is 
resource  rich  in  the  third  row;  and  finally  trade  creation  among  resource  poor 
countries in the last row.  
 
The  coefficients  on  intra-PAFTA  trade  creation  are  all  positive  and  statistically 
different  from  zero.  They  are  not  very  different  from  each  other,  and  when  we 
perform the 6 possible test of equality among intra-PAFTA trade creation coefficients 
we found that only 2 reject the null hypothesis that they are equal. Those are the tests 
for 0 : i j i j H RP RR RR RP    , and for  0 : i j i j H RP RR RP RP    . Note however that we 
cannot  reject  a  joint  test  of  the  six  equalities  simultaneously  suggesting  that  the 
coefficients  on  intra-regional trade  creation  may not be  statistically different  from 
each other after all.  
 
Interestingly the largest coefficients are found for imports of resource poor countries 
from resource rich countries. The coefficient when the importer is resource rich and 
the exporter is resource poor (the second row) is 0.84 and the coefficient when the 
importer is resource poor and the exporter is resource rich (the third row) is 1.40, 
and  the  difference  is  statistically  significant  as  discussed  above.  This  implies  that 
intra-PAFTA trade when the importer is resource rich and the exporter is resource 
poor increased by 132 percent, whereas the increase in intra-PAFTA trade when the 
importer is resource poor and the exporter is resource rich increased by 305% . Thus 
the latter is more than two times larger. 
 
The main prediction of Venables (2011) is that the resource rich countries are more 
likely to experience trade diversion. This prediction is supported by the data in MENA 15 
 
with a decline in imports of non-oil imports from the rest-of-the world of around 38 
percent in the case of resource rich PAFTA countries, and no trade diversion at all in 
the case of resource poor countries. 
 
Table 3 reports results of the same specification as in Table 2, but where we further 
decompose  resource  rich  countries  into  GCC  oil  exporters  and  developing  oil 
exporters. There are no significant differences with the results reported in Table 3, as 
could be expected, but the decomposition is interesting by itself. The top panel reports 
results for total imports and the bottom panel for non-oil imports. Again there are no 
statistical differences between the coefficients in the two panels.   The decomposition 
suggests that the main driver of the large trade creation coefficient in Table 3 for 
imports of resource poor countries from resource rich countries comes from imports 
of GCC countries.  
 
The largest trade diversion effects are to be found in developing oil exporters, and not 
in GCC oil exporters, but the extent of trade creation in GCC is much smaller than in 
developing oil exporters. Thus, in GCC country, the increase in imports from other 
PAFTA countries is on average 107 percent, whereas the decline on imports from the 
rest of the world is estimated at 25 percent. Again this can be surprising but to assess 
the  relative  importance  of  these  two  decreases  one  also  needs  to  consider  the 
difference in the base. Given that initial imports from the rest of the world of non-oil 
imports are at least five times imports of non-oil imports from other PAFTA countries, 
this suggests again a fully trade-diverting PAFTA for GCC members. 
 
In the case of developing oil exporters the percentage decline in imports from the rest 
of the world is actually much larger, around 35 percent for non-oil imports. But the 
average increase in intra-PAFTA trade is much larger too: around 479 percent. Given 
that non-oil imports from the rest of the world are 9 times imports from PAFTA at the 
beginning  of  the  PAFTA’s  implementation,  this  implies  that  the  increase  in  intra-16 
 
PAFTA trade is not fully compensated by the decline in imports from the world in the 
case of developing oil exporter PAFTA members.18  
 
Resource poor PAFTA members experience no trade diversion, and quite significant 
trade creation. While the trade creation is not a prediction of the Venables (2011) 
model, the absence of trade div ersion among resource poor PAFTA members was a 
prediction of that model. 
 
In order to check whether our results regarding trade -diversion and trade-creation 
are sensitive to the use of pre -determined categories of countries (resource rich, 
resource poor, etc.), in Table (4) we report the results of the estimation of the 
specification in equation (3) where instead of using pre -determined categories of 
countries, we measure the extent of concentration in the export bundle of each 
country before the creation of PAFTA and interact that measure of concentration with 
the PAFTA variable. We use two measures of concentration of exports: a Herfindhal 
concentration index, and the number of HS 6 digit goods that the country exports. The 
latter being a measure of divers ification rather than concentration, of course. Table 
(4) has four columns. The first two columns report results for total imports and non -
fuel imports using the Herfindhal concentration index as a measure of concentration.  
 
The last two columns report results for total imports and non-fuel imports using the 
number of HS 6 digit good that the country exports as a measure of the diversification 
of exports before PAFTA was signed. Again, the idea is simply to explore if there is 
some  heterogeneity  in  trade  c reation  and  trade  diversion  when  countries  with 
different degrees of concentration in their export bundle sign a preferential trade 
agreement.  
 
Results  suggest  very  little  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  trade  creation  with  the 
coefficients on trade creation being all positive, statistically different from zero, but 
                                                 
18 More precisely the 67% of the intra-regional trade increase are done at the expense of the rest of the world, 
allowing for one third of pure trade creation.  17 
 
not statistically different from each other across the estimates in the four columns. 
The  interaction  of  relative  concentration  of  the  importer  and  the  exporter  is  not 
statistically  different  from  zero.  This  suggests  that  there  is  little  evidence  of 
heterogeneity in terms of trade creation across country pairs with different relative 
degrees of export concentration. 
 
However,  there  is  some  statistically  significant  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  trade 
diversion that is illustrated by the fact that all the coefficients in the fourth row of 
Table 4 are statistically significant but with opposite results between Herfindhal index 
and  number  of  lines.  More  concentrated  countries  (as  measured  by  a  higher 
Herfindhal  index,  or  a  lower  number  of  products  exported)  tend  to  suffer  from  a 
larger degree of trade diversion. It is difficult to interpret the size of the coefficients 
because  the  variables  are  multiplied  by  the  Herfindhal  index  or  the  number  of 
exported lines, but Figure 1 provides an idea of the size of trade-diversion for the 
different  PAFTA  countries  as  well  as  the  standard  error  of  the  estimate  for  each 
country. 
 
When we measure concentration using the Herfindhal index, Saudi Arabia,  Kuwait, 
Oman, Libya, Yemen and United Arab Emirates all have levels of trade diversion that 
are statistically different from zero with an average decline in imports from the rest of 
the world above 20 percent. When we use the number of export lines as a measure of 
diversification of exports before the agreement was signed, Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain, 
Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Sudan and Yemen all have levels of trade diversion that 
are statistically different from zero with an average decline in imports from the rest of 
the world around 30 percent.19  
 
Finally in order to understand which are the types of goods in which we observe trade 
creation and trade diversion in resource rich and resource poor countries, Figure 2 
                                                 
19 In the case of the United Arab Emirates imports from the world seem to increase after the creation of 
PAFTA, when we use the number of export lines as a measure of diversification, but this could be partly 
explained by a large amount of re-exports in the United Arab Emirates.  18 
 
reports the distribution of export growth by sector between resource rich countries in 
PAFTA  and  the  rest  of  the  world  in  the  top  panel,  and  between  resource  poor 
countries in PAFTA and the rest of the world in the bottom panel.  
 
Interestingly the bottom panel suggest that exports of resource poor countries to GCC 
countries are not as well correlated with export of resource poor countries to the 
world as the exports of resource poor countries to developing oil exporters, or to 
other  resource  poor  countries.  This  again,  suggests  that  there  could  be  some 
significant  trade  diversion  taking  place  in  GCC  countries  when  importing  form 
resource poor countries within PAFTA. The correlation between the distribution of 
export growth from resource rich countries to resource poor countries with export 
growth from resource rich countries to the world in the top panel is also quite strong, 
suggesting again that resource poor countries within PAFTA may not be subject to a 
significant amount of trade diversion.20  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Regional integration is expected to promote intra-regional trade. However, a recent 
theoretical study by Venables (2011) suggests that when resource rich and resource 
poor countries give preferences to each other, the resource rich country is very likely 
to suffer from trade diversion. 
 
In this paper we explore the extent to which MENA different integration schemes have 
led to trade creation and trade diversion. We found significant evidence of increases in 
intra-regional trade following the entry into force of most agreements, and evidence 
of trade diversion in only one agreement: PAFTA. 
 
                                                 
20 In terms of which are the goods with the higher growth in exports of resource poor countries to other 
PAFTA countries these are Machinery and Equipment, Base Metals and Equipment. Rubber and plastics 
seem to dominate exports of resource rich countries to other PAFTA countries.  19 
 
We  then  explore  whether  Venables  (2011)  prediction  was  verified  in  PAFTA  and 
found  that  indeed  the  main  source  of  trade-diversion  in  PAFTA  was  due  to  the 
replacement  of  imports  of  resource-rich  countries  from  the  rest  of  the  world  by 
imports  of  resource  rich  countries  from  other  PAFTA  members.  Resource  poor 
countries suffer no trade diversion.  
 
Putting together these results it suggests that the main beneficiaries from PAFTA were 
resource  poor  countries  that  experience  only  trade  creation  and  benefit  from  the 
trade diversion of resource rich countries at the expenses of the rest of the world. This 
suggests that PAFTA has helped redistribute income from resource rich countries to 
resource poor countries within PAFTA. It also explains why resource rich countries 
may  be  reluctant  to  deepen  further  this  type  of  agreements.  Indeed,  there  are 
certainly more efficient means of redistributing income to resource poor countries in 
the regional than through trade diversion. However non-economic objectives, such as 
reinforcement of the resource-rich country’s hegemonic power, could be one reason 
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Trade creation and Diversion for each agreement involving 




Notes: estimation with OLS; standard errors in italic: heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted for 
country-pair clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: p=0.01 









PAFTA intra 1.039 *** 0.17 1.082 *** 0.17
row -0.181 0.12 -0.195 * 0.12
GCC intra 0.166 0.17 0.260 0.17
row 0.954 *** 0.12 0.956 *** 0.12
AGADIR intra -0.051 0.24 0.042 0.23
row -0.383 0.22 -0.247 0.21
COMESA intra 0.532 *** 0.20 0.522 ** 0.21
row 0.469 *** 0.12 0.395 *** 0.12
Euromed intra 0.325 ** 0.15 0.266 ** 0.15
row 0.102 0.14 0.041 0.14
FTA with EFTA intra 0.535 ** 0.24 0.570 ** 0.24
row 0.237 0.19 0.218 0.19
FTA with TUR intra 0.619 *** 0.30 0.512 * 0.29





















Decomposition of intra-PAFTA Trade Creation and Diversion according to the 
natural resources endowment, 1990-2009 
 
  Notes: all regressions include, in addition to PAFTA, all others agreements dummies also introduced in 
table1 but coefficients are not reported in order to save space. Estimation with OLS; standard errors in 
italic: heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted for country-pair clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: 
p=0.01 











RRi-RRj 1.09 *** 0.24 1.21 *** 0.23
RRi-RPj 0.80 *** 0.20 0.84 *** 0.21
RPi-RRj 1.45 *** 0.26 1.40 *** 0.24
RPi-RPj 0.79 *** 0.23 0.91 *** 0.23
row
RRi  -0.29 *** 0.13 -0.32 *** 0.13
RPi  0.005 0.15 0.01 0.15





















Decomposition of intra-PAFTA Trade Creation and Diversion according to the 





   
Notes: all regressions include, in addition to PAFTA, all others agreements dummies also introduced in 
table1 but coefficients are not reported in order to save space. Estimation with OLS; standard errors in 
italic: heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted for country-pair clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: 
p=0.01 
RRLA stands for resource rich labor abundant (i.e. developing oil exporter) countries, RRLI and 
resource rich labor importing (i.e. GCC oil exporter) countries and RPLA resource poor labor abundant 
countries. 













RPLA 0.66 0.26 ** 1.78 0.65 *** 0.25 0.22 **
RRLA 0.75 0.37 ** 0.17 1.23 0.38 0.46
RRLI 1.54 0.24 *** 2.81 0.61 *** 0.26 0.29 ***




RPLA 0.78 0.26 *** 1.91 0.65 *** 0.53 0.24 **
RRLA 0.76 0.36 ** 1.73 1.22 0.77 0.37 **
RRLI 1.48 0.24 *** 1.62 0.61 ** 0.89 0.25 ***
RoW 0.03 0.12 -0.43 0.20 ** -0.29 0.11 ***
Non-oil Imports Importer








Decomposition of intra-PAFTA Trade Creation and Diversion according to the 




Notes: all regressions include, in addition to PAFTA, all others agreements dummies also introduced in 
table 1 but coefficients are not reported in order to save space. Estimation with OLS; standard errors in 
italic: heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted for country-pair clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: 
p=0.01 









PAFTA intra 1.051 *** 0.18 1.083 *** 0.17 1.186 *** 0.20 1.247 *** 0.20
CIj/CIi.intra  0.009 0.01 0.013 0.01 -0.009 0.06 -0.028 0.06
row -0.005 0.15 0.017 0.14 -0.656 *** 0.15 -0.647 *** 0.15










Total imports Non fuel imports 
(1) (2)
Number of lines Number of lines
Fixed effects (it) Yes Yes
Fixed effects (jt) Yes Yes
Years 1990-2009 1990-2009
Fixed effects (ij) Yes Yes
Nbers of importers a/ 18 18
Nbers of exporters 239 239












Predicted non-fuel trade diversion by MENA countries given the pre-PAFTA 
Concentration index value 








Regional distribution of export growth by sector 
for resource rich and resource poor countries 
 
Exports from resource rich countries 
Export to RPLA  Export to RRLA  Export to RRLI  Export to World 
       
 
Exports from resource poor countries 
Export to RRLI  Export to RRLA  Export to RPLA  Export to World 
       
Note: RRLA stands for resource rich labor abundant (i.e. developing oil exporter) countries, RRLI and 
resource rich labor importing (i.e. GCC oil exporter) countries and RPLA resource poor labor abundant 
countries. 
Source: United Nations’s Comtrade
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Pan-Arab Free Trade 
Area (PAFTA)
Bahrain; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; 
Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Sudan; Syria; Tunisia; United Arab 
Emirates; Yemen
Goods FTA 3-Oct-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-98
Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC)
Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates Goods CU 6-Oct-09 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-03
AGADIR Egypt; Jordan; Morocco; Tunisia Goods 3-Oct-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-04
Arab Magreb Union 
(UMA)
Algeria; Libya; Morocco; Tunisia; Mauritania Goods 2-Jan-12
Algeria-Jordan Algeria-Jordan Goods FTA 2-Jan-02
Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO)
Afghanistan; Azerbaijan; Iran, Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz ; Pakistan; 
Tajikistan; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan
Goods PTA 10-Jul-92 Enabling Clause 17-Feb-92
Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA)
Angola; Burundi; Comoros; Djibouti; Egypt (1999), Eritrea; Ethiopia; 
Kenya; Lesotho; Libya (2005); Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; 
Rwanda; Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe
Goods PTA 4-May-95 Enabling Clause 8-Dec-94
COMESA Free Trade
 Burundi (2004); Comoros (2006); Djibouti; Egypt, Kenya; Libya 




Goods FTA 24-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Sep-05
EC - Algeria EC - Algeria Goods FTA 24-Jul-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Sep-05
EC - Egypt EC - Egypt Goods FTA 3-Sep-04 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jun-04
EC - Jordan EC - Jordan Goods FTA 17-Dec-02 GATT Art. XXIV 1-May-02
EC - Lebanon EC - Lebanon Goods FTA 26-May-03 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Mar-03
EC - Morocco EC - Morocco Goods FTA 13-Oct-00 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Mar-00
EC - Palestinian 
Authority
EC - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 29-May-97 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jul-97
EC - Syria EC - Syria Goods FTA 15-Jul-77 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jul-77
EC - Tunisia EC - Tunisia Goods FTA 15-Jan-99 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Mar-98
FTA with EFTA
European Free Trade  Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; Switzerland Goods FTA 30-Jan-70 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Mar-70
EFTA - Egypt EFTA - Egypt Goods FTA 17-Jul-07 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Aug-07
EFTA - Jordan EFTA - Jordan Goods FTA 17-Jan-02 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-02
EFTA - Lebanon EFTA - Lebanon Goods FTA 22-Dec-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-07
EFTA - Morocco EFTA - Morocco Goods FTA 20-Jan-00 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Dec-99
EFTA - Palestinian  EFTA - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 23-Jul-99 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jul-99
EFTA - Tunisia EFTA - Tunisia Goods FTA 3-Jun-05 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jun-05
EFTA - Turkey EFTA - Turkey Goods FTA 6-Mar-92 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Apr-92
BTA with Turkey
Turkey - Morocco Turkey - Morocco Goods FTA 10-Feb-06 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-06
Turkey - Palestinian 
Authority
Turkey - Palestinian Authority Goods FTA 1-Sep-05 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jun-05
Turkey - Syria Turkey - Syria Goods FTA 15-Feb-07 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jan-07
Turkey - Tunisia Turkey - Tunisia Goods FTA 1-Sep-05 GATT Art. XXIV 1-Jul-05
BTA with US
US - Bahrain US - Bahrain
Goods & 
Services
FTA & EIA 8-Sep-06
GATT Art. XXIV & 
GATS V
1-Aug-06
US - Jordan US - Jordan
Goods & 
Services
FTA & EIA 15-Jan-02
GATT Art. XXIV & 
GATS V
17-Dec-01
US - Morocco US - Morocco
Goods & 
Services
FTA & EIA 30-Dec-05 GATT Art. XXIV & GATS V1-Jan-06
US - Oman US - Oman Goods & 
Services
FTA & EIA 30-Jan-09 GATT Art. XXIV & 
GATS V
1-Jan-09
Austria (1995); Belgium; Bulgaria (2007); Cyprus(1995); Czech 
Republic (1995); Denmark (1973); Estonia (2004); Finland (1995); 
France; Germany; Greece (1981); Hungary (2004); Ireland (1973); 
Italy; Latvia (2004); Lithuania (2004); Luxembourg; Malta(2004); 
Netherlands; Poland (1995); Portugal (1986); Romania (2007); Slovak 
Republic (2004); Slovenia (2004); Spain (1986); Sweden (1995); 
United Kingdom (1973)
EC Treaty
FTA with non MENA countries
BTA intra-Mena (and not already included in intra-MENA FTAs above)